Back in 2022, Ukrainian field regulations still said artillery fire correction from the air should be carried out by helicopter.

Read that now and it feels like something from another age. On today’s front line, drones watch, spot, correct fire, hunt armour, strike positions, map routes and shape movement every hour of the day.

They are not a supporting feature of modern war. They are one of its defining conditions.

Spend any real time looking at how this war is being fought and the pattern becomes impossible to ignore. The defining change is the size of the kill zone. In earlier phases of war, danger was often shaped by artillery range and direct contact over a far shorter distance.

Now, on some parts of the front, that zone can extend to nearly 30 kilometres because drones are constantly searching, identifying movement and feeding strikes into the system. Once you enter that space, survival drops sharply. That is why Russian forces can lose thousands of men in a day.

Troops, vehicles and resupply are exposed long before they reach what used to feel like the actual battle. The front is no longer just a line of trenches or guns. It is a deep belt of observation, targeting and destruction.

Electronic warfare sits right in the middle of that fight. Signals are jammed. Navigation is thrown off. Video feeds disappear. Most drones fall from the sky before they reach their target.

That has not slowed the drone age down. It has forced both sides to build cheaper, more adaptable systems, accept losses and keep iterating. Ukraine learned to fight like this because it had no choice.

Britain now has far fewer excuses for not learning the same lesson. The Strategic Defence Review accepted last year that the future force has to be shaped by drones, data and digital warfare, and that innovation now has to move in months, not years.

UK Defence Innovation said in December that it would inject over £142 million into drone and counter-drone technology in its first year. The UK and Ukraine have gone further still in recent times, committing to deepen cooperation on unmanned systems, counter-drone technologies, electronic warfare and the protection of critical infrastructure.

All of that is real progress. It would be foolish to pretend otherwise. The problem is that progress is not yet the same thing as structure.

In a 2025 Occasional Paper for the Royal United Services Institute, Justin Bronk made a point Britain should still take very seriously: the UK has maintained world-class signals analysis and mission-data programming expertise, especially through the Joint Electronic Warfare Operational Support Centre and the Typhoon Mission Support Centre, but those scarce strengths need greater investment if they are to keep pace with rapidly evolving digital threats.

That matters because the argument here is bigger than buying more drones. A country can buy thousands of airframes and still be dangerously behind if it cannot detect new signals, analyse them quickly, update threat libraries, reprogramme systems and get those changes back out to the front line at speed. A drone force without that backbone is just a procurement headline.

Bronk’s RUSI paper is especially useful because it strips away the comforting fiction that Europe has this covered. It argues that NATO remains heavily reliant on the United States for key parts of airborne electronic warfare, including collection, analysis and support jamming, and that Europe has no true equivalent to capabilities such as the US Navy’s Growler force.

That warning has not aged badly over the past year. If anything, it has been reinforced by events. Britain is investing, partnering and experimenting, but none of the announcements since then amount to a dedicated Drone Force or a single command built to own this problem from end to end.

That is an inference from what the government has actually announced: projects, funding streams, regulatory reform and joint programmes, all important, all welcome, but still fragmented.

And this is where much of the public debate still lags behind reality. Too many people still think about drones as flying bombs or surveillance gadgets. That is only the visible edge of the system. The real fight runs through the spectrum, the software, the mission-data cycle, the analysts, the engineers, the operators and the command structure that pulls all of it together.

Ukraine has understood that under the worst possible pressure. Britain still shares responsibility across the Army, the RAF, the Royal Navy, specialist units and procurement teams, and that can mean a less efficient solution.

A Drone Force would deal with that directly. It would give Britain a command that wakes up every morning thinking about low-cost mass, software updates, electronic warfare, detection, counter-drone defence, rapid production, base protection and how to move learning from workshop to frontline unit far faster than our current structures allow.

It would give operators, engineers and spectrum specialists a proper career path rather than treating them as peripheral talent living somewhere off to the side of “real” military life. It would give ministers a single institution to back, challenge and hold accountable.

There is also the very meaningful point worth holding onto: no single European country can rapidly build full end-to-end capability across every aspect of electronic warfare on its own, and genuine multinational cooperation will be required. Fine. That is sensible.

But cooperation works best when each country brings serious capability to the table. Britain’s job is not to wait around for a perfect allied model. It is to build something credible enough that others want to align with it.

The good news is that Britain is not starting from scratch. There are already British routes into more affordable stand-in electronic attack through the RAF’s Autonomous Collaborative Platforms strategy. And since that was announced, the broader direction has only become more visible: Project Octopus is being scaled with Ukraine, Project NYX is pushing ahead with autonomous systems linked to Army aviation, and ministers are now publicly talking about the need to strip away regulatory barriers slowing robotics and autonomous defence technology.

In plain English, there is already a path in front of us. We do not have a problem of lack of brains, talent or industrial potential. Far from it, in fact, but it’s my view we need structured very targeted investment.

Recent events have made that even harder to dodge. RAF Regiment personnel have just become the first drone “aces” in the Middle East after shooting down Iranian drones while protecting British personnel and assets, using a system of early warning, electronic warfare and air defence.

That is a useful reminder that this is not some specialist argument about one future war in one distant theatre. British forces are already operating inside the age of drones.

Ukraine has built that seriousness because survival demanded it. The country has learned how to fight in a world where drones are everywhere, where electronic warfare is constant, where mission data ages quickly and where adaptation is part of the daily routine.

Britain keeps discussing these things as though they belong to the future. They do not. They belong to the present.

This is why I keep coming back to the same conclusion. Britain does not need another modest programme, another review cycle, or another set of announcements about “exploring opportunities” in uncrewed systems. It needs a Drone Force.

A real one. A dedicated arm built around reconnaissance, strike, electronic warfare, counter-drone defence and rapid adaptation. A force that understands the electromagnetic spectrum is now part of the main battlefield, not a specialist annex to it.

There is no silver bullet here. Any serious person looking at Ukraine should know that by now. Interceptors matter. Jamming matters. Detection matters. Mobile response matters.

Data fusion matters. Industrial capacity matters. Training matters. The point of a Drone Force is that one command owns the problem as a whole.

Britain still has the luxury of acting before war teaches this lesson by force. Ukraine had to build its drone doctrine while cities were under attack, troops were under pressure and every mistake carried a body count. We are in a different position.

We have the time to organise properly, the money to invest, the industrial base to build, and the allies to do this with seriousness. That advantage only matters if ministers use it.

The Prime Minister, the Defence Secretary and the chiefs of staff should stop treating drones as an adjunct to existing power and start treating them as a central fact of modern war.

Create a Drone Force. Give it command authority, doctrine, budget and a direct link to Britain’s best engineers and operators. Build it now, while the lesson is still one we can study rather than one we are forced to live through.

Britain needs a Drone Force. Ukraine has already written the playbook. The only real question is whether we act on it in Whitehall now, or wait until events make the decision for us.

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Andriy Dovbenko is the Principal of UK-Ukraine TechExchange

LBC Opinion provides a platform for diverse opinions on current affairs and matters of public interest.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official LBC position.

To contact us email opinion@lbc.co.uk

The UK has made clear that it wants to become a hub for defence innovation. Recent moves to welcome companies like Helsing, Stark and Anduril suggest that ambition is being put into action.

But if Britain is serious about securing its national defence, enhancing its capabilities (within the existing budget) and supporting allies, it must do more than roll out the well-trodden red carpet for the usual suspects, the US and European players.

Instead, the UK must think a bit more creatively and build an accelerated framework to onshore the world’s most battle-tested innovators: Ukraine.

The war in Ukraine has transformed the landscape of modern warfare. Out of necessity, Ukrainian engineers have pioneered technologies in drones, battlefield autonomy and electronic warfare that have outpaced many NATO systems in both development and deployment. These are not conceptual products or lab-based prototypes; they’re hardened, iterated and adapted under constant pressure on the battlefield.

In June, the UK and Ukraine struck an agreement to ‘share information and expertise,’ particularly when it comes to drones. Yet, despite the clear value of these technologies, there is currently no formal UK policy that supports Ukrainian defence startups in scaling and manufacturing in the UK. No defence-specific Innovator Founder Visa. No incentives for dual-use R&D, shared IP schemes or sovereign manufacturing partnerships. No cross-government initiative is identifying and enabling the companies producing these next-generation systems and giving them a clear pathway to set up in the UK.

Meanwhile, the UK’s new Security Strategy, its upcoming Defence Industrial Strategy and its “NATO-first, but not NATO-only” doctrine all point to the need for closer collaboration with non-traditional partners — precisely the kind of cooperation that Ukraine represents.

In Ukraine, war has turned startups into critical infrastructure. Companies born in workshops and garages have developed tools for drone detection, automated targeting, EW jamming, secure comms and AI-driven decision support. Some are now an uncompromising necessity on the front lines.

Take Kyiv-based Kvertus, for example; its automated drone detection and suppression systems have saved over 100k lives since the invasion. Its hardware covers almost 6k frequencies (the world’s largest database) to automatically detect and suppress enemy drones targeting military, civilian and critical infrastructure. Survival on the front line without its technology is measured in minutes. The world has been so preoccupied with building drones as part of modern warfare that the ability to defend against them has almost been forgotten.

Two-year-old Huless is another example of Ukrainian ingenuity that has rapidly adapted alongside specific battlefield needs. As a key provider of drone solutions, it has integrated with six major digital communication suppliers, delivering fully equipped and operational drones that are ready to use straight out of the box. It has also partnered with four unmanned sea vehicle (USV) companies (two Ukrainian and two European) to actively integrate drone solutions into their maritime platforms. The company’s most impactful breakthrough stems from frontline collaboration in extending the operational range of unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) by up to seven times. It has also developed a mission planning tool, enabling troops to select optimal routes for UGVs and relay drone positions to prevent or minimise signal loss.

Companies like these don’t need months of wargaming or years of procurement bureaucracy to prove their worth. They’ve already done that, with real soldiers, under real fire. If Europe is looking at technology that could be used to defend against any potential threat, Russian or otherwise, Ukraine is a good place to start.

But for these technologies to survive, scale and contribute to broader European defence, they need support. And Ukraine, under relentless bombardment, cannot provide the industrial base required for mass production. This is where the UK has a unique opportunity as part of its 100-year partnership with Ukraine.

For Ukrainian companies, relocating or expanding to the UK offers access to trusted export routes, proximity to NATO partners and a robust defence-industrial ecosystem. For the UK, it brings in proven capabilities, shorter development cycles and deeper operational knowledge of emerging threats. It can then integrate these technologies into initiatives like the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), a UK-led coalition of Northern European nations, including the Baltic states and Nordic countries, alongside the Netherlands, where Ukrainian-born technology can help defend wider Europe from any potential future threat.

This isn’t charity. It’s strategy.

Yet today, there is no fast-track route for Ukrainian founders to establish defence operations in Britain. While schemes exist for some high-potential entrepreneurs, they are not fit for purpose in the national security domain, where confidentiality, manufacturing controls and Ministry of Defence (MoD) collaboration are essential.

We risk letting these companies fall through the cracks. Worse, we risk losing their technologies to jurisdictions with more open arms.

If Britain wants to live up to its security ambitions, it needs a dedicated Accelerated Security Innovation Pathway, one that specifically targets Ukrainian defence firms whose technologies have been proven under battlefield conditions, can be applied to UK defence and are ready to scale.

This pathway should include:

These are not radical ideas. They echo what the UK is already doing, just not yet for Ukrainian innovators.

In many ways, the UK has been ahead of the curve. It was one of the first to provide military support to Ukraine. It has championed the value of agile, dual-use innovation. And it has recognised that future wars will be won not just with tanks, but with semiconductors, sensors and software.

To make that vision real, we must look beyond the familiar players and seek opportunities with the unconventional. We must recognise that some of the most effective tools in today’s conflicts are being built not just in Silicon Valley or Berlin, but in Lviv, Kyiv and Kharkiv.

If the UK wants to build a truly resilient defence sector and help ensure Ukraine’s long-term ability to defend itself, it must do more than offer praise. It must offer pathways.

On the outskirts of Kharkiv in northeastern Ukraine, Ukrainian electronic warfare teams are deploying home-grown systems that automatically detect and suppress Russian drones. Along the southern front, domestically developed observation drones are giving Ukrainian troops real-time visibility in contested airspace. These are not prototypes; they’re battle-proven Ukrainian technologies saving lives on a daily basis and shaping the future of warfare.

Yet as Ukraine cements its reputation as a defense tech powerhouse, a strategic risk is emerging. Without robust intellectual property (IP) protections, Ukraine may lose control of the very breakthroughs that are currently helping to defend the country on the battlefield. Ukraine could potentially win the war itself and secure national survival, only to lose the innovation economy that should underpin its recovery.

Wartime urgency creates pressure to sacrifice IP sovereignty. Startups under fire need capital, global market access, and production capacity which foreign investors and international partners can provide. But too often, these deals require handing over IP rights. What looks like a lifeline can, in fact, be a strategic loss.

This leaves Ukraine exposed to a quiet leakage of its designs. Meanwhile, the absence of a strong domestic IP framework risks pushing entrepreneurs to register patents and commercialize outside the country, where protections are stronger and funding is more accessible. The result could be both a brain drain and an innovation drain, hollowing out Ukraine’s defense tech sector just as it proves its global potential. Instead of becoming an international hub, Ukraine risks being relegated to the status of pipeline for foreign defense industries.

The case for IP sovereignty is not only about Ukraine’s economy and national security; it is also about the future resilience of Europe and NATO. For Ukraine, retained IP means royalties, licensing revenues, and a steady funding stream for reconstruction. It signals to investors that Ukraine is not just a wartime incubator but a serious innovation ecosystem. Most importantly, it preserves national sovereignty. Control over sensitive technologies ensures Ukraine is not permanently dependent on foreign suppliers for security.

For Kyiv’s allies, Ukrainian IP is also an important asset. The United States is currently exploring a multi-billion dollar joint drone production deal with Ukraine. But if Ukraine cannot retain ownership, partners risk relying on fragmented supply chains and losing access to innovation. Europe’s Defense Industrial Strategy, launched this year, calls for a resilient continental base. That goal will be undermined if Europe’s most battle-tested and innovative nation loses control of its own technologies.

Protecting IP involves more than goodwill. It requires policy, legislation, and institutional design. Every foreign aid package and licensing deal should include explicit protections for Ukrainian IP ownership. Likewise, technological solutions co-developed with international partners must not result in the wholesale transfer of rights.

Ukraine’s current plan to relax restrictions on some categories of arms exports is good news. Export barriers force many firms into joint ventures (JVs) or licensing arrangements that often strip away their IP protections. Enabling direct exports would ease this dependency on JVs or licensing, reducing both complexity and IP risk, as well as the danger of leakage. Ukraine should encourage co-production and investment, but on terms that guarantee domestic equity and enforceable IP rights.

Currently, the Ukrainian government is closely monitoring its top innovators to prevent IP leaks abroad. Some companies have sought to incorporate outside of Ukraine in order to free themselves from these shackles, but have encountered problems related to unfair IP structuring. One solution could be greater intergovernmental cooperation. This could allow Ukraine to access external capital and expertise while keeping control over core technologies.

Tech parks and defense incubators should anchor talent domestically, providing access to funding, testing grounds, and mentorship. With 40,000 trained drone pilots and a new generation of AI engineers, Ukraine could benefit hugely if the country can create the right climate to build global companies at home. Speed is also important. Traditional patent offices often move too slowly for battlefield innovation. Ukraine needs a dedicated defense IP office to fast-track protection, address dual-use complexities, and guard against theft or predatory licensing.

The Israeli experience provides a potentially useful model for Ukraine. Decades of conflict have forced Israel to develop technologies with immediate battlefield relevance. Crucially, Israel has managed to retain IP sovereignty, even when foreign funding was involved, and has built an ecosystem where defense innovation feeds into global competitiveness.

Europe also offers lessons. Airbus shows how multinational collaboration can preserve shared IP while scaling production across borders. The overall objective is clear: Ukraine should be positioned as a central node in Europe’s defense industry and not just as a subcontractor.

Ukraine’s battlefield innovations are saving lives today, but they can also lay the foundations for tomorrow’s Ukrainian economy. Without IP sovereignty, Ukraine risks becoming a laboratory for others. With the right frameworks, Ukraine can transition from its current status as a war-driven exporter of ideas to become a global defense industry innovation leader. This can only happen if the country’s IP assets are protected.